It was scary to see a person jumping from the visitors’ gallery and throwing a smoke grenade in the sanctum sanctorum of Indian democracy – the Lok Sabha – yesterday.
He had managed to bring in the smoke grenades hidden in his shoes before he threw them inside the House. It cannot be a coincidence that this happened on the 23rd anniversary of the 2001 Parliament attack in which several security personnel had lost their lives, and to whom the Parliamentarians had paid homage earlier during the day.
The fact that the two accused could break several layers of a formidable security system to commit this act is beyond doubt a serious security breach, and the agencies responsible for it have a lot to answer for.
The Security of Parliament Consists of Four Layers
The first layer is at the main gate itself where the Delhi Police and Parliament's security staff are deployed in civil dress for access control. The access to the Parliament House is constantly under surveillance with cameras. Section 144, preventing the collection of crowds near the Parliament House, is permanently imposed in the area.
Any visitor wanting to enter the gate has to have an authority letter permitting him to visit the Parliament along with identity proof. The authority letter may be issued by a Member of Parliament or the In Charge of Security — who is an IPS (Indian Police Service) officer responsible for the security of the entire Parliament complex. The authority letters may also be issued by either of the two Directors of Security — one is for the Rajya Sabha and the other one for the Lok Sabha. These Directors are either from the Central Armed Forces or police officers on deputation with Parliament Security.
The second layer of security is the reception area where the visitors, after being physically frisked and having to pass through metal detectors at the Parliament Complex gate, are ushered in for another round of scrutiny, that is, the authority letter and identity verification.
The reception also is manned by the Parliament security staff. After the security check at the reception, the visitors are issued passes to visit a specific area of the Parliament complex for which they have the authority letter, like the Parliament Library, Museum, or any of the houses, etc. All items carried by the visitors after scanning are deposited at the reception where after they are escorted to the respective places by the security Staff. Visitors are not allowed to go anywhere other than the place for which the authority letter has been issued to them.
The third layer is at the entrances of the visitors' gallery of each of the Houses where visitors are once again physically frisked and made to pass through metal detectors.
Finally, the fourth layer of security is in the visitors' gallery itself where the Parliament security staff and Delhi Police personnel are seated in civil dress to keep an eye on the visitors and to prevent any untoward activity by them. Other Parliament staff is additionally deputed to ensure that the visitors maintain proper decorum throughout.
Security Failures on Different Fronts
Given the rigour of the security system as explained above, it is extremely surprising that the perpetrators could carry the smoke grenade hidden in their shoes. Had the security staff been vigilant, these should have been detected at the main gate itself if the casing of the grenades were made of metal.
If, however, the casing of grenades was of plastic, these could have escaped detection by metal detectors. The fact that these were hidden in the shoes would have affected their gait and walk which should have been noticed by the discerning eye of a trained security staff. That they could not detect it speaks poorly of their training standards and ability to observe deviant or unusual behavior.
The second failure is that of the security personnel and other staff deployed in the visitors' gallery. The security team should have been able to prevent the perpetrator from jumping from the gallery. That the second person almost jumped in as well also speaks poorly of the alacrity of the security staff deployed in the gallery.
The last but not the least, and a very important aspect, is the failure of the intelligence agencies in being able to detect the plans for this attack. How can six people, all from different states coordinate such a massive attack without leaving electronic footprints? How can smoke grenades which are not openly available be procured by someone without intelligence agencies even getting a wind of it?
With Khalistani protagonist Gurpatwant Singh Pannun reportedly having threatened to attack Parliament around 13 December, the Intelligence agencies, along with the Parliament Security Staff and the Delhi Police, should have been ready.
Reportedly, the authority letter for the perpetrators was issued by an MP belonging to the BJP. While it is difficult for an MP to verify the credentials of every individual who makes a request to them for visiting the Parliament, there is a need for better scrutiny by the staff of MPs in these matters. Hopefully, the inquiry will keep this aspect in mind.
The incident highlights the need for a thorough review of the prevailing security situation of Parliament. Some measures being discussed are fixing a transparent glass wall in front of the visitors' gallery to prevent similar acts in the future, and installing scanners like the ones at airports. Reportedly, it is also being discussed that more manpower will be deployed for Parliament's security.
While a review of manpower needs is essential given their deployment for both the old and new Parliament complex, it is the quality of such manpower that needs attention. It is the human resource that needs to be trained to be more vigilant and proactive to prevent such acts in the future.
It is a sad state of affairs that after every such incident, we say “not again” but fail to draw appropriate lessons and rectify things. Things are forgotten after a while and it is business as usual till the next such episode. Hopefully, we will draw appropriate lessons from this incident and take remedial measures at the earliest to prevent such setbacks.
(Sanjiv Krishan Sood (Retd) has served as the Additional Director General of the BSF and was also with the SPG. He tweets @sood_2. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)
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