On Bhutanese FM Tandi Dorji's Trip to China, and the Implications for India

For the first time ever, the Bhutanese foreign minister Tandi Dorji visited China and met with the Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi on 23 October 2023. What makes this visit special is the fact that Bhutan and China do not have officially established diplomatic relations.

In addition to this, the two sides also concluded the 25th round of the stalled border talks. The last border talks were held in 2016.

Both these developments are substantial as Bhutan and China have shown keenness to develop proper diplomatic relations and also work towards delineating and demarcating the border.

In the words of Wang Yi, “The conclusion of boundary negotiations and the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Bhutan fully serve the long-term and fundamental interests of the country and nation of Bhutan”.

'It is Not Up to Bhutan Alone to Fix the Problem'

The Bhutanese side has been making statements regarding its keenness and urgency to resolve the border issue with China since March 2023. The Bhutanese Prime Minister Lotay Tshering had made remarks to a Belgian newspaper stating that Thimphu will be looking at ways to resolve the border issue with China in “one or two meetings”. China and Bhutan have already established a Joint Technical Group (JTG) in September 2023 for the delimitation of the boundary.

Bhutan has disputes with China in the northern (Jakarlung and Pasamlung Valleys, area of around 500 square km) and western region (the Doklam region, 270 square km). Bhutan has also been focused on studying how India resolves the ongoing military standoff since the Galwan clashes of 2020. Such statements only underscore the pressure that the Bhutanese government has been facing from Beijing. There have been reports that China is already constructing villages along the border in the Bhutanese territory.

Both Bhutan and India have disputed borders with China. The way Bhutan resolves its border dispute with China has a direct bearing on the Indian border situation. It is no surprise that China and India were pitched into a military standoff in the Doklam region of Bhutan which lasted for almost 76 days in 2017. If Bhutan agrees to swap territories with China it may impact the security of India’s precarious ‘chicken’s neck’, a sliver of territory that connects the Indian northeast with the rest of the country.

Till now Bhutan has been very vocal about the Indian concerns and has shown its commitment to the Friendship Treaty. The Bhutanese PM has consistently argued that when it comes to discussions around the Doklam region, India will be a part of the discussion. It has been acknowledged that the tri-junction issues go beyond the Bhutan-China bilateral border negotiations. In the words of the Bhutanese PM, “Doklam is a junction point between India, China, and Bhutan. It is not up to Bhutan alone to fix the problem. There are three of us. There is no big or small country; all are three equal countries, each counting for one-third”.

The quick resolution of the border issue with Beijing is the only option left to Thimphu to avoid the ongoing salami-slicing by Beijing. Salami slicing has been one major method adopted by China to put pressure on other countries. Given that the border is not demarcated and the perception of the border is generally different on both sides, it is easy for Beijing with its superior military strength to undertake such acts.

Both India & Bhutan Face Renewed Challenges From China

Another major factor could be the consistent rise in the Chinese military and economic strength. The Chinese military is superior and increasingly more aggressive under the leadership of Xi Jinping, and ready to exploit its rising power. This change in the military equation has changed the ground realities of defense of the smaller nations like Bhutan which have an ongoing border issue with Beijing. To complement this China has also been showing its readiness to invest in Bhutan.

India is the main investor and economic partner of Bhutan. However, the domestic shifts in the economic and political sphere in Bhutan coupled with the changes in the South Asian geopolitics will push the nation to look for alternatives. It will also push Bhutan to carve out its own political space and role in the region.

Bhutan has been committed to its friendship with New Delhi and has also been mindful of Indian security concerns vis-à-vis the border negotiations. However, New Delhi will also need to acknowledge that the contours of the challenge to Bhutanese sovereignty have also changed. As India is facing renewed and zealous challenges from Beijing, the same is true for Bhutan as well.

Given this change in the ground realities, it is not wrong for Thimphu to look for a resolution of the border issue, at least in the areas where it can undertake a bilateral decision. However, what makes it challenging for Bhutan as well as India is the trilateral portions of the border coupled with the rising nationalisms within India as well as China. The India-China boundary dispute has the capacity to subsume the Bhutanese issues.

It also shows the difficulty that Bhutan as a sovereign nation faces if it wants to look for a solution on its own. It is dependent on India for its economic growth and security and angering New Delhi will not be conducive and Beijing does not provide an equally benign alternative.

India will be very watchful of the direction of this relationship, as it will be a great indicator of how deep the Chinese roots in South Asia are and whether India challenge this.

(Dr Gunjan Singh is an Assistant Professor at Jindal Law School, OP Jindal Global University. Her research interests are in the fields of Chinese Foreign Policy, China-South Asia Relations, Domestic Politics in China, Chinese Media, Mainland-Taiwan Relations and Space Security. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)