The conflict that began during the early hours of 7 October this year, following the brazen terror attacks carried out by the Gaza Strip-based Hamas against Israel, is not coming to an end any time soon.
Instead, the situation on the ground is getting grimmer with each passing day, and the repercussions both in the wider Middle Eastern region and in different parts of the world have become discernible.
Alongside the internal dynamics within the Israeli and the larger Palestinian societies (both in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank), there are already signs of the implications of the ongoing conflict vis-à-vis the regional geopolitics of the Middle East.
What remains to be seen is the likely impact this conflict will have on the diplomatic efforts being made by Israel to warm up to the Arab neighbours, and lately also the possibility of a regional conflagration should countries like Iran decide to join the conflict.
This piece highlights some of these issues, with a focus on the impact on Israel’s regional policy, the impact on its newfound bonhomie with the moderate Arab countries, and the Iranian dimension in this conflict.
Steadily Mounting Castigation Against Israel
Similar to the events in the past, the retaliatory military operations (mostly aerial bombardment and partial ground operation inside Gaza) currently being carried out by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), in the wake of the well-orchestrated Hamas missile and ground attacks, have resulted in widespread condemnations over “heavy strikes” and criticisms about “violation of humanitarian laws and international conventions.”
It is perceptible that the longer it continues, the greater the possibility of the fault lines in the region widening, particularly between Israel and some of its regional adversaries. In a region that is plagued by sectarian politics, civil wars, the scourge of terrorism, the phenomenon of radicalisation, and a history of Arab-Israeli wars, this could be an undesirable by-product of the conflict.
The tone and tenor of the Arab countries, including those with whom Israel has established diplomatic ties, have also changed, particularly following the bombing of the al-Ahli Arab Hospital (on 19 October) inside the Gaza Strip (for which both the warring parties blamed each other).
The steadily mounting castigation against Israel has come at this juncture when its politico-diplomatic recognition and acceptance are gradually on the rise in the Middle East. This has been evidenced by the signing of the Abraham Accords in late 2020 with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain from the Middle East, and Morocco and Sudan in the northern African region.
Since its establishment as a state in May 1948, coming out of Arab encirclement and forging political ties with the regional countries have been Israel’s national interests and foreign policy objectives. It is to that end that efforts have been made (until the conflict started) for normalisation of ties with Saudi Arabia, with the assistance of the Joe Biden administration.
This, for now, has been put on the back-burner, mostly by the Saudis who would not want to be singled out for warming up to a regime that is criticised vociferously in the region and elsewhere for its Palestinian policy.
Difference in Sentiment: The Arab Elite & the Arab Street
As the war rages, most of the Arab countries, including the ones that have established political ties with Israel, have been compelled to condemn Israel’s retaliatory actions, regardless of its clarifications that it is a war against “Hamas terrorists” and it is not targeting civilians in Gaza. In light of this, the prolongation of violence will likely make the geopolitics of the wider Middle East more complex, particularly for Israel’s politico-diplomatic overtures.
This is because the recent geopolitical realignment in the region is believed to be brought about by the understandings and convergence of interests mainly between the ruling elites of both sides, while the larger public sentiments in the Arab and the Muslim world apparently lie with the Palestinians.
The eruption of protests on the streets of Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, and Yemen, and also in Morocco, a signatory of the Abraham Accords – following the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas conflict, could be interpreted as disapproval of the wave of normalisations from particular sections of the societies in the region. Such activities are also construable as a disconnect between the leaders in the Arab countries and their ordinary citizens.
Furthermore, having encountered the bitter experiences of the Arab uprisings (that began in late 2010) which engulfed almost every part of the Middle East, the leaders in this region would not take any chance either to irk or perturb the sentiments of their general masses. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia, cannot afford to witness such mass movements at this stage when they both are making unrelenting efforts to deescalate tensions in the region, transform themselves into financial and technical hubs, attracting tourists, businesses and investments from every possible part of the globe.
Interestingly, this was also one of the main reasons why they have established diplomatic ties with Israel, alongside their shared concerns over Iran’s controversial nuclear program. Currently, it will be complicated for Saudi Arabia to openly embrace Israel given that it is the custodian of Islam’s two holy sites; it needs to continue preserving its religious standing in the region and beyond in the Islamic world.
Tellingly, the current Saudi monarch – King Salman – having been an ardent supporter of the Palestinian cause, would not like to trigger the public by signing a decree announcing the normalisation with Israel.
As a result, the kingdom, under the leadership of the Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), also considered the de facto ruler, can be expected to walk a delicate tightrope, with objectives in mind to increase the credibility as a responsible Islamic country working for the welfare of the fellow Palestinians as well as to reduce regional tensions so that its Vision 2030 could become a successful story.
These predicaments would necessitate the ambitious young leader to express solidarity with the Palestinians (for now) and work closely with the regional partners, including Iran, with whom Riyadh signed a reconciliation deal in March this year.
This also means that the normalisation process with Israel will be put on hold for the moment, but without ruling out the possibility of a political breakthrough at an opportune moment.
Iran and Its Proxies
While Iran has been closely monitoring the emerging developments (with intermittent anti-Israel inflammatory statements from its top leadership), further intensification of clashes between Lebanese-based Hezbollah and Israel could be another undesirable trajectory of the conflict. In the event that Iran decides to intervene in the conflict directly, Israel will have to fight the war on multiple fronts, which it is presently doing in the north (in Lebanon) and east (in Syria).
That will transform the trend of “limited conflicts” which Israel has been fighting for the longest time. It is noteworthy that since the last few years, the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has been talking about Iran’s “regional presence” giving the country a “strategic depth and more power.”
This hints at the presence of Iran-backed proxy forces that operate across the region, particularly in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, and also at the long-range missile capabilities the country’s military possesses. The involvement of Iran and its proxies, undoubtedly, carries the risk of igniting a regional conflagration, and in such a scenario, one cannot not rule out the possibility of extra-regional powers like the US, Russia, China, etc., supporting their respective allies in the region.
Notwithstanding these worst-case scenarios, it remains to be seen if the existing socio-economic predicament inside Iran will prevent its leadership from taking any adventuristic policy and participating directly in the war against Israel.
Or, is it going to be the proxies who are going to jump into the fray, as already indicated by Yemen-based Houthi’s long-range missile attacks against Israel, reportedly fired from the southern part of the Red Sea? Further escalations on this front could be a game changer, risking a region-wide conflict.
Looking at the developments on the ground, there is no end in sight to the conflict between Israel and Hamas. The Israeli government, however, has made it clear time and again that its goal is to “destroy Hamas” and this is exemplified by upping its bombardment in the Gaza Strip. At the same time, nobody has any concrete answer as to how the war will be ended, whether there will be a ceasefire, what a future in the Gaza Strip will look like, who will rule the strip, and what will be Israel’s policy once it manages to achieve its “goal”.
But, one thing is certain further escalations of the conflict will put the entire region in a precarious position, let alone Israel. In the days to come, the role of countries like Egypt and Qatar in the region could be closely monitored. The future course of the conflict, however, will likely be determined by the willingness of Israel to enter into any negotiations, but who could convince it at the moment is going to be one of the biggest questions.
For Israel, the assault by Hamas on the wee hours of 7 October 2023 was unprecedented in several ways, and it is being viewed as a renewed existential threat, which it can no longer afford to ignore. For the Palestinians, its longstanding unresolved issue is back in the spotlight, which cannot be ignored anymore.
The ongoing conflict also indicates that there cannot be a ‘new Middle East’ without resolving the Palestinian issue, and merely managing this conflict will not change the dynamics. With the emerging developments, it is sufficient to say that peace and stability in the Middle East look to be a distant prospect.
(The author is an Assistant Professor at the Symbiosis School of International Studies [SSIS], Symbiosis International [Deemed University], Pune, Maharashtra. Prior to this, he served as Consultant [Strategic Affairs] at the National Security Council Secretariat, Prime Minister’s Office, New Delhi. This is an opinion piece, and the views expressed are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)
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