The continued violence in Manipur and allegations that illegal entrants from Myanmar have played a major role in fomenting the trouble there has brought the necessity of effective management of the India-Myanmar border into sharp focus. Four Northeastern States of Mizoram, Nagaland, Manipur, and Arunachal Pradesh share a 1643-long border of India with Myanmar.
The level of border guarding/management along this border can be said to be at a stage even lower than what existed along the borders with Pakistan both on the East and West prior to 1965.
COBs Located at a Distance From Border
The State Armed Forces which were responsible for guarding those borders at that time were maintaining at least some presence along the border by establishing a few Border Out posts (BOPs). However, that is not the case with the India-Myanmar border. Even though Assam Rifles (AR) has been designated as the border guarding force for the India–Myanmar border as per the recommendation of the "Group of Ministers” after the Kargil episode, it has consciously decided to continue operating from Company Operating Bases (COB) located in depth far away from the border.
These COBs are more suited for the role of AR as a Counter Insurgency Force of the Northeast rather than border-guarding. COBs being located far away from the border do not facilitate continuous 24*7 domination of the border.
The border being open is subject to exploitation with ease. The information about any crime happening near the border is, therefore, unlikely to reach Assam Rifles in proper time frame to prevent a border crime or apprehend criminals because the difficult, underdeveloped terrain prevents swift movement of troops to reach the crime scene from COBs located far away.
Even though the border is properly demarcated, it remains open to encroachment and exploitation by criminals because of inaccessibility and lack of 24*7 surveillance.
Inaccessibility is one important reason often cited by Assam Rifles for not adopting the forward posture to establish BOPs along the border because the lack of road communication will prevent proper logistics support to troops deployed on the BOPs.
While the problem of logistics for BOPs is a fact, yet the inertia to develop such infrastructure for over 20 years after being declared a designated force to guard this border is indicative of reluctance to venture out of the comfort zone.
Strict Surveillance Must Be Effected
It is important to realise the fact that the terrain along the Line of Control (LOC) in Kashmir and the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) in Siachen is comparable to the terrain along the border in Arunachal where the Indian Army has evolved a very effective logistic chain along these De-facto borders.
Further, the terrain along the border with Bangladesh in Eastern Tripura and Western Mizoram – guarded by the Border Security Force (BSF) – is exactly the same as along the border with Myanmar in Mizoram, Nagaland, and Manipur for which AR is responsible. Road connectivity to some areas along these borders guarded by the BSF has come up only in the last few years.
The BSF, however, has always manned these borders in a forward posture with deployment on BOPs sited close to the border, thereby, ensuring continuous surveillance and domination of the border. Troops were and even now are being logistically supported through helicopter sorties on many BOPs on these borders. Such sorties are also made available for evacuation of troops in case of emergencies.
Suffice it to say that some infrastructure could have been created close to the border in the last 20 years and troops pushed forward to man the BOPs for round-the-clock surveillance starting initially with a sensitive portion of the border.
Unregulated Entry and Exit, Inadequate Forces
Another factor necessitating round-the-clock guarding of the border is the “Free Movement Regime” (FMR) prevailing along the border with Myanmar. FMR provides for tribals to cross from designated points. However, open borders and the absence of forces other than at the designated points, make it difficult to regulate the entry and exit effectively.
The border being open, the tribals easily come in and go out from anywhere without the forces coming to know of it. This increases the scope of tribals illegally settling in India.
A forward deployment on BOPs will obviate this problem as it will enable proper monitoring of all entrants. Another factor affecting proper border management is the inadequate force level earmarked for the border guarding/management role by AR.
Even if the yardstick of inter-say distance of 3.5 Km between two BOPs as a yardstick fixed by MHA, is applied to this border also, a total of 470 BOPs will be required to be established.
Considering an average of 15 BOPs to a unit (BSF unit of 7 Companies with 6 deployed and one training reserve), a total of 32 units along with supervisory headquarters will be required. The AR unit with 6 companies (5 deployed and one training reserve) will require many more units in forward deployment on BOPs. AR has 46 units but only 15 are earmarked for border management with the remaining tied down with the role of Internal Security.
In view of the fact that the Northeast has more or less remained peaceful after the “cessation of operation” with insurgent groups came into effect in early this century, more units could have been earmarked for Border management. This preoccupation of AR with Internal Security has prevented it from evolving effective SOPs and drills for border management.
Security Situation Warrants BSF Guarding
It will not be prudent to ignore the potential for the revival of separatist insurgencies in the Northeast especially in view of what is happening in Manipur, AR may not be able to spare any additional units for border guarding. It will, therefore, be prudent to deploy a force other than AR exclusively for border-guarding and AR-assigned internal security roles.
AR with deep historical connect, knowledge of the terrain, culture, and ethos of Northeast, and vast experience of operating against insurgents and separatists in that area will be more effective in this role. This besides ensuring proper border-guarding will go a long way in improving the internal security situation in Northeast.
The BSF with over 57 years of experience in border guarding along India – Bangladesh and India – Pakistan borders in varying terrain including the one similar to India-Myanmar borders in Tripura and Mizoram is best suited for being assigned the task of guarding India-Myanmar border.
BSF should establish and operate from BOPs located close to the border which will, besides serving as bases for tactical operations to guard the border, also present a face of government authority to the border population living in those remote areas.
Another factor in favour of the deployment of BSF along this border is that it was deployed to guard parts of this border in Manipur till early this century. It was de-inducted consequent upon AR being assigned to these borders.
BSF continues to have a presence in Manipur, Nagaland, and Mizoram. These establishments of BSF will prove very effective in ironing out issues if any with concerned state authorities, thereby, smoothening the induction process.
Border Population Needs Proper Integration
One important task of border guarding forces is to promote a sense of security amongst the border population. This is achieved not only by carrying out tactical operations to dominate the border but also by identifying and projecting problems of the border population to concerned authorities.
The BSF as a sole visible symbol of government authority in remote border areas has been carrying out this role very effectively and thus, helps integrate the border population with the mainstream.
However, the prerequisite for forward deployment is the creation of adequate infrastructure along the border in due course of time. The creation of infrastructure viz composite BOPs, border roads, and obstacle systems will also provide employment opportunities to the border population and wean them away from anti-social activities.
The induction of BSF will have to be phased with the more sensitive border along Manipur being taken over in the first phase followed by Mizoram, Nagaland, and Arunachal. Additional units of BSF will have to be raised. It can initially be done by pooling troops from existing units and simultaneously recruiting fresh personnel for raising additional units.
The entire transition should be carried out in properly planned phases so that domination along sensitive borders with Pakistan and Bangladesh is not diluted. BSF troops will require familiarisation with the terrain and culture of the area, dynamics of FMR, and various bilateral agreements with Myanmar having bearing on operating along those borders.
In 2014, there were several reports suggesting that the Ministry of Defence had agreed to hand over this border to BSF with a rider that it will continue to control AR as it has a major role in case of war in the east. The BSF was to be deployed by the end of 2014. However, the proposal did not materialise.
Reportedly, the Government of India is once again considering deployment of BSF on this border.
An early decision to deploy a regular Border Guarding force for continuous domination of the India – Myanmar border is extremely important to curb any further illegal migration from troubled Myanmar. This will go a long way in enhancing National Security, both along the border and Internally.
(Sanjiv Krishan Sood (Retd) has served as the Additional Director General of the BSF and was also with the SPG. He tweets @sood_2. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)
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