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Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent Delhi visit, though only for a few hours, has heralded a new start to bilateral relations in more ways than one. First, the timing of the visit was significant. Putin came even as Russian troops are amassed on the borders of Ukraine, and on the eve of his virtual meeting with US President Joe Biden, where Ukraine figured majorly on the agenda.
Russia’s ties with NATO and the west have nosedived like never before. The economy is struggling and COVID-19 cases are rising. The visit also saw the beginning of the 2+2 dialogue between the foreign and defence ministers of both countries. Even with the threat of CAATSA hanging over it, India has gone ahead with the acquisition of the S-400 Triumf missile system, and an agreement for defence cooperation for the next decade was signed. With India’s closeness to the US and Russia’s close ties with China, both India and Russia sent a message to their respective adversaries. Much has already been discussed and analysed about this.
The new chapter in bilateral relations, however, may not just be about India pacifying its long-time reliable buddy that it has not moved away from it, or each side allaying the other about the unease that has crept in because of the Indo-US relations and the Sino-Russian ties. It may also be about Russia finally coming to recognise and acknowledge India as a rising power. Russian analyst Dmitry Trenin of the Carnegie Moscow Center made this point in his article “Russia-India: From Rethink to Adjust to Upgrade”, calling on Russian political elites to see India for what it is.
Sure enough, Putin himself in his address said, “Russia views India as a major power, whose people have been very friendly to us. Our relations proceed from a very positive foundation. They are developing and forward-looking.”
Russian columnist Dmitry Kosyrev echoed this in his post-summit column in Ria Novosti, analysing the event.
Why does Russia need to acknowledge India as a great power? Simply because Russia needs India now, perhaps even more than the other way around.
Next, Sino-Russian close ties are not organic. There are points of deep mistrust, and hence the dependence is more a matter of political exigency. Both are united with their opposition to the US, and Russia is a good source of energy and defence technology for China. But Chinese investments in the struggling Russian economy have shrunk. According to Russia’s Central Bank, in 2020, China withdrew its investments in the Russian economy. Direct investment fell 52% in three quarters, from $3.735 billion to $1.83 billion.
In spite of its opposition to the US, China has still not recognised the Russian annexation of Crimea. On the other hand, Russians fear a Chinese demographic invasion of the Russian Far East, where many Chinese nationals have settled down, setting up businesses. This is one of the reasons to be factored in when analysing Indian cooperation in Russia’s Far East. There are Russian fears of Chinese irredentist claims both in Siberia and in Central Asia – Russia’s strategic backyard.
The current Russian security strategy is focused on the Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP), which seeks to connect the economies of the Eurasian region – from South East Asia to Europe. Russia sees itself, courtesy of its geography, as playing the central role in this partnership. As part of this, the Russia-spearheaded Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) has tied up with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), yet China has refused projects like the Eurasia railways as not being profitable.
While Central Asian countries have signed up to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) eagerly, often in the hope of receiving huge Chinese investments, there have been territorial clashes, as between Kazakhstan and China. China’s expansionist policies have also resulted in unease in the region, as can be seen in the territory that Tajikistan had to cede to China earlier and in the claims made by Chinese media more recently. Economic leverage has allowed China to set up a military base there.
Initially welcoming of the Taliban as an anti-US force, Russia is increasingly becoming disenchanted with the group. Its numerous military exercises in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan along the border with Afghanistan demonstrated its readiness simultaneously to deal with the fallout of changed circumstances in Afghanistan – drug trafficking, refugee flows, the spread of terrorism, and religious radicalism in the region.
In all of this, India is a valued partner, as the points of friction that Russia has with China are missing in the equation with India.
Finally, the more recent threat of pan-Turkism may threaten Russia’s role in Eurasia. The Organisation of Turkic States, being led by Turkey, currently has sought to bring the four Turkic Central Asian states – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – together with Azerbaijan and Turkey together to form a yet another economic and socio-cultural bloc. Along with military, Turkey’s soft power is thriving in the region and the concept of ‘Greater Turan’ is taking hold, more worryingly for Russia, amongst its Turkic population within the borders of the Russian Federation.
Pan-Turkism is also a threat to India as Turkey has demonstrated its potential to foment trouble in South Asia. Increasingly, Turkey, backed by Qatar, may seek to control the narrative in Afghanistan. The differences between India and Russia on Afghanistan are increasingly narrowing.
India is already part of BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. It is also seeking to foster closer cooperation with the EEU and invest in connectivity projects like the Chabahar port and the International North-South Transport Corridor.
Along with all this, India remains Russia’s largest arms market. Putin’s visit, therefore, may not just start a new chapter in bilateral relations, but one in which India occupies a bigger strategic space for Russia.
(Aditi Bhaduri is a widely published journalist and political analyst. She tweets @aditijan. This is an opinion piece. The views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)
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