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The killing of an innocent Muslim boy in Ballabhgarh by self-styled champions of Hinduism symbolises a new form of communally organised targeted violence in contemporary India. This form of violence, as it is popularly believed, did not begin with the lynching of Mohammad Akhlaq in Dadri (UP) in 2015. Instead it has evolved in the years post 1992.
The demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992 could be identified as a decisive contemporary moment in this regard. Although the organised violence on communal lines continued to take place at regular intervals after 1992, the intensity and pace of these riots changed quite significantly.
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One might observe two kinds of violent events that took place during this period – the riots with low intensity (in terms of casualties and impact) and the riots with high intensity targeting a particular community (such as Gujarat 2002 and Muzaffarnagar 2013). Interestingly, in both the cases, the violence was concentrated to a specific region/state and did not spread out.
The Prevention of Communal and Targeted Violence Bill, 2011 is very relevant in this regard. This bill, as it is well known, was drafted by the National Advisory Council in the context of the Gujarat riots of 2002. Although the bill was finally withdrawn by the government on 5 February 2014, the discussion on the bill offers us a comprehensive interpretation of the term ‘communal violence’ in recent years.
The bill, most importantly, made a serious attempt to offer a legal interpretation of the causes that often lead to communal violence at various levels.
Section 1 (f) of the Prevention of Communal and Targeted Violence Bill, 2011 says:
‘….hostile environment against a group means an intimidating or coercive environment that is created when a person belonging to any group… is subjected to any of the following acts:
(i) boycott of the trade or businesses of such person or making it otherwise difficult for him or her to earn a living; or,
(ii) publicly humiliate such person through exclusion from public services, including education, health and transportation or any act of indignity; or,
(iii) deprive or threaten to deprive such person of his or her fundamental rights; or,
(iv) force such person to leave his or her home or place of ordinary residence or livelihood without his or her express consent; or,
(v) any other act, whether or not it amounts to an offence under this Act, that has the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment.’
This categorisation of the context of violence and identification of possible victims stems from the policy discourse of the 90s, when mobilisation of the marginalised groups was turned into a political issue.
Hence, religious and linguistic minorities, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes at the state level are demarcated as groups that require protection against targeted violence.
There were two kinds of broad criticisms against the bill. It was argued, particularly by the Hindutva groups such as the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS), that the bill is intentionally anti-Hindu. A letter submitted to the Governor of Andhra Pradesh on 10 November 2011 says, ‘…in the guise of protecting minorities, it (the bill) assumes that the majority community i.e Hindus are always the initiator and perpetrator of riots and violence, anytime, anywhere that may happen in the country.’
The letter also raises two other issues: The misuse of certain provisions of the bill and an overtly global Islamic threat that helps the Muslims in India to act against the Hindus.
These criticisms are not entirely new. The RSS’ perception of the Indian Muslims as a global threat to Hindus has been expressed in a variety of ways. Be it the discussion in the late 1980s on the desecration of Hindu temples by Muslims in medieval India to the recent debates on ‘love jihad’, the RSS evokes the global Muslim homogeneity as a reference point to assert the claim that the militarisation of Hindus is necessary for self-defense.
The second kind of criticism was based on technical grounds. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) and even the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPM) along with other regional parties criticised the bill from the perspective of federalism. In a discussion on the bill in the Rajya Sabha, Arun Jaitley (who was also the leader of the House then), said:
Like the BJP, which simply tried to focus on the procedural aspect of the bill, the CPM took an almost similar stand on this issue. Sita Ram Yechury said:
The ambivalence on part of the CPM is quite understandable. Communal violence is an important political agenda for the CPM that actually defines its ideological position in the post 1992 period; at the same time, the state level competitive politics makes it difficult for the party to ignore political centralisation.
Two inferences can be drawn on the basis of this long drawn debate over the bill on communal violence. Firstly, it is officially documented that “communal violence” is no longer a conflict between two or more communities.
The distinction between usual encounters and organised violence targeting a particular group was deemed necessary to focus on the specificity of contemporary communal confrontations. This was helpful in perceiving communal violence as a form of ‘targeted violence’.
Second, the Prevention of Communal and Targeted Violence Bill, 2011 seems to establish a very crucial link between marginalisation and targeted violence. Although this bill could not become a law, the definition of the “group” invoked by the bill (a religious or linguistic minority, in any State in the Union of India, or Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) undoubtedly responds to the fact that poor Muslims, Dalits, women and tribal communities are the main targets by the Hindutva forces.
Thus, lynching and killing of Muslims is not communalism; instead, it is communally organised targeted violence. Unfortunately, we do not have an adequate legal framework to deal with it; nor do a political will to oppose it stridently.
(The writer is assistant professor, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, and Rajya Sabha Fellow 2015-2016. He can be reached @Ahmed1Hilal. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)
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