'God Save Pakistan': The Role of the US and the Army Behind the Next Government

Serendipitously, it is only the US military wherewithal that can help the Pakistani 'establishment'.

It is only the American Military wherewithal (material and intelligence) that can help the Pakistani 'establishment’ (read, Military) connect shared concerns with its ongoing and bloody surge of terrorism, against Afghanistan-based groups like Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP).

(Photo: Chetan Bhakuni/ The Quint)

Jamil Dehlavi’s 1992 film Immaculate Conception has a eunuch called Shahzada who ascribes the survival of Pakistan to three elements ie, Allah, America, and the army. History validates that varied degrees of permutation and combination of these three elements have decided the sovereign fate, especially as to who will rule, overtly or covertly.

Currently, the Real McCoy in Pakistan is General Syed Asim Munir who ticks all three boxes – The professional soldier (only 'Sword of Honour’ to reach the top job), prefixing his name with 'Syed’ (honorific title afforded to direct descendants of the Holy Prophet), and with a rare Hafiz status (someone who has memorised the Quran).

The religious but reticent general is also seemingly practical as he has gone about re-stitching ties with the United States of America, recognising the utility of American support in facilitating life-sustaining support (via direct aid, trade, or even leverage with multilateral bodies like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank).

Serendipitously, it is only the American military wherewithal (material and intelligence) that can help the Pakistani 'establishment’ (read, military) connect shared concerns with its ongoing and bloody surge of terrorism, against Afghanistan-based groups like Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP).

So, the timeless trinity of Allah, America, and the army are calibrated to ensure the desired outcomes.

'Selection’ vs 'Election’

Indeed, Pakistan is purportedly a participative democracy, but the 'state within a state’ or the Pakistani military, invariably manages to 'select’ a dispensation of its choice – the final result can never be a free choice, realistically.

From manipulation, sheer coercion, or blatant denialism, everything is on the table. Imran Khan was the Pakistani ‘establishment's’ chosen one in the 2018 general elections (as Nawaz Sharif had then alluded to the invisible hand of Khalai Makhlooq or aliens, a metaphor for the ‘establishment’!), but the vainglorious Pathan started believing his own invincibility rather prematurely and had to be cut to size and made persona non grata.

Currently, he languishes in jail and many of his colleagues were forced into a mass exodus, and he is forced to field his candidates as 'Independents’ as a Supreme Court order has stripped them of their party symbol.

No Party Is an ‘Establishment’ Favourite, the Final Call Will Be Taken Later

Only Imran’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) is unpalatable and not on the menu. Other than PTI, everything is on the plate.

While Nawaz Sharif (Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz or PML-N) as the current favourite may be murmured, the 'establishment's’ deep recess of institutional memory would recollect that the wily Mian Saheb had trouble with all of the six army chiefs that he personally appointed (often by bypassing seniority on the failed assumption of buying loyalty).

Three of the six bumped him off (Waheed Kakar, Pervez Musharaff, and Qamar Bajwa), one of them he forced to retire prematurely (Jehangir Karamat), and two of them were their own men giving Nawaz Sharif sleepless nights (Pervez Kayani unilaterally extended his own term by three years, while Raheel Sharif after threatening to do likewise, secured a more lucrative job as the commander in-chief of the 41-nation Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition in Saudi Arabia).

But both Asim Munir and Nawaz Sharif are wise enough to downplay the murky past in mutual interest.

The Sindh-based Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) has had its own complicated history with the ‘establishment’ (remember, General Zia-ul-Haq had hanged Zulfiqar Bhutto, and General Pervez Musharraf had his own beef with Benazir Bhutto) – but history notwithstanding, it is perhaps the inability of PPP to make adequate traction in Punjab, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, and Baluchistan that weakens its case.

Therefore, from a possible PML-N government to a coalition of the (un)willing a là the recently disbanded Pakistan Democratic Movement, or in the extreme case of no option, even a 'national/caretaker’ government eg, Shaukat Aziz (PM in 2004-2007) formula of competent technocrats – anything is possible.

Finally, the end results will determine the optimum configuration; till then, no favourites.

Formal Military Takeover Is Very Unlikely

With about 33 years formally under Military rule (1958-1971, 1977-1988, 1999-2008), the dour and broody generals have finally woken up to a better option of pulling strings from 20 km away down the roads of the capital city of Islamabad ie, garrison township of Rawalpindi General Head Quarters (GHQ).

The façade of democracy persists, while the 'establishment’ can still dictate the terms and budgetary allocations, for itself.

Today, when it seeks to curry favour with the 'free world’ of the proverbial 'West’, the necessity of this democratic pretence gets even more accentuated.

Lastly, there couldn’t have been a more opportune time to take over the reins if the ‘establishment’ really wanted to (with discredited politicians and emergency-like socio-economic conditions) – the fact that it still didn’t do so, and is going ahead with elections, suggests that it wouldn’t do so, going forward either.

The 'Failed State’ Wouldn’t Fail, After All

Many prophets of doom have speculated on the implosive spiral towards a ‘failed state’, and frankly, there are logical reasons for that to happen.

But it wouldn’t be allowed to fail, not with an estimated 90 nuclear warheads in its arsenal.

The global stakes and implications are simply too high for everyone (including India, which, misplaced bravado notwithstanding, should never wish for a ‘failed state’ across its Line of Control), and the least visible (but highly imagined) element of the United States, will not allow it to fail. It cannot afford to fail. Period.

Realistically, the US will legitimise the farcical choice of a 'selected’ government to persist, whatever its shape, form, or nomenclature.

Mullahs Will Increasingly Play the Second Fiddle of Tick-in-the-Box

Chickens pandering to religiosity are coming home to roost, and how?

2023 saw an unprecedented escalation of terrorism with 789 recorded terror attacks and 1,524 violence-related fatalities. The 'establishment’ is at the forefront of facing the brunt and they will not allow a government that actively supports terrorism or hyper-religiosity, in practice.

However, since the entire edifice and rationale of the sovereign is predicated on the 'land of the pure’ and that also legitimises its 'establishment’ with marches to the motto of 'Iman, Taqwa, Jihad fi-Sabilillah’ (A follower of none but Allah, the fear of Allah, Jihad for Allah’) – so the show of piety must go on, albeit, only in words and not in spirit or action.

The next government will be dealing with religion-inspired (or sectarian) related intolerance and therefore, it cannot be the one, that fans the same.

Pakistan will continuously walk the talk of its patently duplicitous spiel, but topicality demands and history suggests, that the incoming 'selected’ government will be decidedly more moderate and reformist, not because it wants to be so, but because it has no option, but to be so.

It is as Pakistan-born writer Tariq Ali noted, “As long as the Pentagon bankrolls the Pakistan army to fight its wars, and NATO troops remain in Afghanistan, there will be quarrels, charges of infidelity, a reduction in the household allowance, perhaps a separation – but a divorce? Never."

Given that the NATO troops are out of Afghanistan does not weaken the argument, but strengthens the same, even more.

As of now, even the Pakistani 'establishment’ would not have made up its mind on whom to call, or what shape or composition of government, it should have – but it would be absolutely clear of whom, or what instincts, it wouldn’t want. The rest can wait.

(The author is a Former Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Puducherry. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)