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Tuesday, 15 May, 2018, will go down in history as a day when Indian politics rewrote Harold Wilson’s oft-used quote that a week is a long time in politics. In India, clearly, four hours is enough. At 12 noon, the Bharatiya Janata Party was celebrating a big victory in Karnataka. By 4 pm, HD Kumaraswamy of the Janata Dal (Secular) was waving to his supporters as a potential king of Karnataka.
Here then are my ten takeaways after a day of high drama.
The BJP may claim that as the single largest party which is just eight MLAs short of a majority, the party has won the people’s mandate.
In the first past the post system, mandates are about the final numbers: in the 2014 general elections, the BJP had 31 percent of the vote but won 282 seats, a decisive mandate. In Karnataka, the BJP with 36.2 percent of the vote won 104 of the 222 seats, a strong showing but a far-from-decisive win, a reflection of the fact that Karnataka is still a mirror cracked with distinct sub-regional trends.
Let’s be clear that the Siddaramaiah government was rejected by the people of Karnataka. A dozen ministers in the government lost their seats, the chief minister was defeated in Chamundeshwari by over 30,000 votes and barely scraped through in Badami. The Congress may take heart from the fact that its vote percentage was at 38 percent almost two percent higher than the BJP (and actually one percent higher than when it won a majority in 2013) but that is no consolation.
Right through the campaign, the Congress chief minister positioned himself as the regional satrap taking on the mighty Delhi durbar of Narendra Modi. He claimed to be the original Kannadiga hero who stood for a sub-national pride. That image appeared to sway many observers (including this writer).
In the end, Siddaramaiah couldn’t cut across Karnataka’s sharp caste, regional and religious divides – as his defeat in Chamundeshwari showed, even on his home turf, he was back to where his political career had begun – the tallest Kurba caste leader but not quite a Kannadiga icon we imagined him to be.
And while his welfarist schemes like Anna Bhagya had earned him the goodwill of people, his political decisions, be it offering minority status to Lingayats, taking on the Gowda family, refusing to share power with other Congress leaders or celebrating Tipu Jayanti with state funding, appeared to backfire.
If the BJP almost won Karnataka, the Modi-Shah duo deserve much of the credit. They lifted a party that was struggling to find an effective narrative for change, that didn’t have a local leadership of genuine substance, and one whose social base was much smaller than the Congress.
Shah’s organisational rigour and Modi’s oratorical skills almost pulled it off. In fact, there is enough reason to believe that it was the prime minister’s final push in May that almost took the BJP to victory. The over-reliance on Modi is a double-edged sword: it gives the party a boost in a presidential-like election but runs the risk of being subject to diminishing returns in the long run.
Sometimes, a seemingly invincible political machine can appear intimidating to smaller parties, one reason why the Shah-Modi duo may find it difficult to deal with the coalition mantra, especially in the 2019 elections.
Forget corruption, collapsing infrastructure, drinking water scarcity, farmer suicides, all the government ‘bhagya’ schemes, in the end, caste alignments determine votes. The Vokkaligas stood by the Gowdas, the Lingayats by Yeddyurappa, the Kurbas, and Muslims with Siddaramaiah. Only the Dalits were split wide open between ‘left’ and ‘right’ Dalits, a reminder of the deep ‘sub-caste within a caste’ fissures. We thought that Siddaramaiah's ‘AHINDA’ strategy would carve out a broad pro-poor alliance of the backward: we forgot that the poor too wear their sharp caste identities when they enter the polling booth.
Prime Minister Modi is right that the BJP has disproved the belief that the party is a Hindi-Hindu-Hindustan with its strong performance in a southern state.
Nowhere was this better demonstrated than in the BJP’s sweep in coastal Karnataka, where there was a conscious strategy to project the Congress as an anti-Hindu, pro-minority party to achieve majority community consolidation.
This undercurrent of ‘Hindu-ness’ extended to urban Karnataka as well, a reminder that the ‘educated’ middle classes are particularly susceptible to toxic and divisive religious agendas.
Right through the elections, most pundits and pollsters kept writing off the JD(S) as a declining political force that would be squeezed out by the rampaging two big ‘national’ parties.
Gowda has been in politics for fifty-plus years, cutting deals and building solid grassroot networks: 2018 was time to encash the IOUs. He struck a pre-poll ‘secret’ understanding with the BJP by which BJP votes were transferred to the JD(S) in southern Karnataka even while the favour was returned in coastal, central Karnataka and even in parts of old Mysore. Elections done, Gowda and son have bargained with a weakened Congress in their attempt to be kings and not just kingmakers. In a de-ideologised political marketplace, there are truly no permanent friends or enemies.
Karnataka was Rahul Gandhi’s big test after taking over as Congress President. He didn’t quite flunk it but neither did he pass.
Yes, he put in a lot of effort in the campaign but the connect with the masses is still missing as is a unified Congress organisation. There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that at the local level, not every Congress leader was willing Siddaramaiah to win: in a party stuck with a crab mentality, you only rise by bringing your rivals down.
Rahul needs to re-invent himself and his party; it will require a mix of grit, charm and patience – qualities that he still hasn’t quite shown. It is significant that when it came to post-poll deal-making, it is Sonia Gandhi and the Congress’ old guard that stepped in. Rahul, after all, disparagingly referred to Gowda and sons as the B-team of the BJP on the campaign trail.
Post-poll wheeling dealing is an integral element of a hung assembly so let’s not get too self-righteous about what’s happening in Karnataka now. The BJP did it brazenly in Goa, Manipur, and Meghalaya, now the Congress and the JD(S) are attempting a post-poll coalition in Karnataka while the BJP looks to break parties. Resorts will be booked, MLAs will be enticed, the Raj Bhavan will be the scene of much political intrigue.
‘Iss hamam mein sab nange hain’ is my favourite description of our political rulers. Or as the former Samajwadi Party leader Amar Singh once memorably said in a television debate , ‘tum karo toh Ras Leela, hum karein toh Character Dheela!’ One can only feel sorry for the people of Karnataka who need good governance not perennial political instability.
Karnataka is a tough state to predict with a one percent swing resulting in a big shift in seats. So we should give a break to the pollsters who got it wrong and take exit poll numbers next time with less certitude: India Today’s Axis My India, for example, has been on a dream run, only to face the harsh reality that no pollster is infallible.
Maybe, our reporters who were suggesting a 50-50 fight were better positioned to predict a hung assembly. And while I apologise for getting the exit poll numbers wrong, let me remind you: in my ten pre-poll takeaways, I had warned that the Karnataka political league could be heading for a super-over. Well, that’s exactly what we’ve got!
(This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)
(The story was originally published on Bloomberg Quint)
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