Indo-Iran Relations: A Timeline of Patchy and Sporadic Cooperation
Iranian Presdeint Hassan Rouhani is expected to visit India on 15 February, kick-starting a three-day tour,
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Iranian President Rouhani is set to arrive in India on Thursday, 15 February, on a three-day visit to strengthen diplomatic and commercial relations between the two nations.
Rouhani’s visit is his first to the country after assuming power in August 2013. According to local Iranian media reports, Rouhani is expected to discuss the "latest regional and global developments" with Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
Ahead of Rouhani’s visit to India, here is a precursory glance at the relations between the two countries that once shared a border, and can now be described as ‘patchy and sporadic’ at best.
When Did We Recognise Each Other?
Iran and India shared a common border till 1947, wherein after partition, the border became a part of the newly-formed Pakistan. India and Iran established diplomatic relations in 1950.
Over the next 50 years, several leaders and prime ministers from both countries exchanged visits, beginning with Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi’s tour of India in 1956. Subsequently, Prime Ministers Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi too visited Iran in their tenure.
Ties between the two countries gained a new momentum at the turn of the millennium when in 2001, the then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited Tehran and signed the ‘Tehran Declaration’, which marked the areas of possible cooperation between the two countries.
Continuing the trend, the then Iranian President Mohammad Khatami visited India in 2003 as the Chief Guest of the Republic Day parade, where he signed “The New Delhi Declaration”, which set the ball rolling on strategic partnership in various areas of interest.
Ever since, the two countries have developed trade relations in several areas, predominantly in Iranian crude oil.
Oil Trade and the Gas Field Snub
In 2017, India and Iran locked horns over the latter country floating a tender for the Farzad B gas field. India has long been attempting to negotiate a bid which will allow the country to dig for oil and develop the gas field.
In 2016, Petroleum Minister Dharmendra Pradhan accompanied by representatives of ONGC, IOCL, GAIL and MRPL visited Iran to hold discussions on Farzad B and other related matters.
India has been a significant importer of Iranian oil, with Tehran emerging as the country’s third largest oil supplier. In fact, in 2009, India had accounted for close to 40% of Iran’s oil exports making it the second-largest importer of oil, after China.
In 2011, when the Obama administration tightened the noose around Iran over their nuclear activities by imposing sanctions, India albeit cutting down on its exports, continued to purchase a lesser quantum of Iranian oil in the Indian Rupee.
Hence, Iran’s initial snub to India by passing over the contract to Russia-based gas exponent Gazprom indicated a strain in the ties between the two countries. Following this exchange, although the Iranian government has maintained that India might be on the verge of losing out on the bid to the gas filed, Indian officials seem sure of a positive outcome.
According to The Hindu, an official from the Petroleum Industry said:
The same report states that like the Farzad B gas field, the Iran-Pakistan-India LNG pipelines to have literally been sitting ‘in the pipeline’.
The Momentous Strategy That is the Chabahar Port
India’s effort to ramp up two berths at Iran’s Chabahar port is largely being viewed by the world as a move to counter Pakistan’s Gwadar port, which helps China extend its base across the Arabian sea and Indian Ocean.
The first phase of the port was inaugurated on 3 December 2017, effectively opening a new strategic route connecting Iran, India and Afghanistan bypassing Pakistan, and reflecting growing convergence of interests among the three countries. Located at 80 kms from the Gwadar port, the Chabahar port is situated in the Sistan-Balochistan province and is easily accessible from India’s western coast.
During his 2016 visit to Iran, Modi signed a contract on the Chabahar port, enabling an investment of up to $85 million towards its development. Under the agreement signed between India and Iran in May that year, India is to equip and operate two berths in Chabahar Port Phase-I with capital investment of $85.21 million and annual revenue expenditure of $22.95 million on a 10-year lease.
The port is being viewed as a gateway to opportunities for trade by India, Iran and Afghanistan with central Asian countries, thereby providing a landlocked Afghanistan with an alternative access to regional and global markets.
India-Iran Defence and Military Cooperation
Indo-Iran defence strategies have long been a bone of contention for the US, which views Iran as a hotbed of terrorism. Thus, India’s relations with Iran have been under the superpower’s scanner, with the latter often calling out India for its relations with Iran.
However, independent of US’s viewpoint, the establishment of an Indo-Iran joint commission in 1983 helped lay the foundation with respect to military ties and defence co-operation between the two countries.
In 1993, after the Iran-Iraq war, Iran sought India’s assistance to develop three Kilo-class submarines it had procured from Russia, since India has sought to maintain a favourable relationship with respect to arsenal development.
In 2001, the two countries signed a MoU in defence, and subsequently 2003’s ‘New Delhi Declaration’ called upon the two states to ‘increase strategic collaboration in third countries’ i.e. Afghanistan.
Taking off from the Chabahar port development, India and Iran also seek to keep waterways open for trade and development purposes, thereby investing in joint naval operations and exercises, apart from sea-lane control and security.
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