Dantewada Blast: Security Forces' Laxity Caused Maoists To Strike, Say Officials

Senior officials said that reduced anti-Maoist operations in Chhattisgarh have made the troops "sloppy”.

"Over the last few years, there has been a decrease in anti-Maoist operations by the security forces, and their presence has been largely confined to their base camps. This gradually allowed Maoists to re-activate their movement in areas that were under the dominance of security forces," a senior Chhattisgarh police official said.

(Photo: DPR/Chhattisgarh)

"Small mistakes are leading to major loss of life..." a senior Chhattisgarh police official told The Quint after the state witnessed one of the most gruesome attacks by Maoists this year, which claimed the lives of 10 jawans and a civilian driver on Wednesday, 26 April.

"Over the last few years, there has been a decrease in anti-Maoist operations by the security forces, and their presence has been largely confined to their base camps. This gradually allowed Maoists to re-activate their movement in areas that were under the dominance of security forces."

The official

"Simply closing your eyes in the face of a problem doesn't make it go away or any less problematic than it already is," the official added.

Even as Chhattisgarh Chief Minister Bhupesh Baghel paid tribute to the martyrs in Dantewada on Thursday, 27 April, officials in the know raised multiple questions about the attack, how it was carried out, and the possible missteps that may have allowed the attack to happen.

Here are the five major questions that remain unanswered:

1. What Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) were followed during the movement of troops to and from forests?

2. What were the operational failures that resulted in the loss of 11 lives, including that of a civilian driver?

3. How were Maoists able to plan and execute an IED blast between two security camps?

4. What did the security forces do differently this time, which allowed Maoists to attack?

5. If the fight against Maoists is really "in its last leg," how are they able to attack troops so close to their camps? 

'Laxity Among Troops'

Speaking to The Quint, the senior official said that the reduced number of anti-Maoist operations and the confining of the forces to their camps or district headquarters have bolstered the morale of the Maoists.

Family members of the martyrs of the Dantewada Maoist attack at their funeral. 

(Photo: Sourced by The Quint)

"There are only two ways by which we can say that the Maoist movement is nearing its end. First, if we have been able to kill, capture, or bring them back to mainstream society; and second, if we have stopped going into the forests, doing operations, and snatching Maoist grounds. Because if we do not go outside and do not carry out operations, we will have fewer casualties and encounters. This is exactly what's happening in Chhattisgarh."

The official

After the attack on 26 April, Bastar Inspector General of Police P Sundarraj – while responding to a question of whether SOPs were followed and the Road Opening Party was activated before the DRG personnel's convoy was brought back – said that they were trying to "determine the sequence of events."

The IG further stated that efforts were being made to "identify the point of mistake" before taking any further action.

Intelligence & Operational Failures?

Another fact worrying the officials is that the site of the attack is situated between two camps of security forces – one in Aranpur and another in Sameli. Moreover, the Aranpur police station is around 700 metres away.

The IG also revealed that the IED was triggered from a distance of 150-200 meters, and the Maoists were hiding on the left side of the road when coming from Aranpur. 

Sources told The Quint that the Maoists couldn't have gotten the chance to carry out an attack so close to the security camps if the troops were being sent out for practices like area domination, search and seizure, among other things.

Another senior official told The Quint:

"The attack took place between two security camps and near a police station. It's evident that the Maoists had enough confidence that they would go undetected. It also explains that since the forces are not going out and doing operations, the Maoists are reasserting their dominance in areas which supposedly are under the forces' dominance."

The IED blast by Maoists left a crater 15-20 feet wide on Aranpur-Sameli-Jagargunda road. 

(Photo: Raunak Shivhare/The Quint)

Another key event under question is the usage of private vehicles to ferry DRG personnel, who often use motorcycles and travel in small groups.

Speaking to The Quint, former Special Director General of Police of Chhattisgarh RK Vij said that the DRG personnel should have been more careful and avoided using vehicles, especially since the Maoists were observing a tactical counter-offensive campaign (TCOC) – as they do every year between April and July.

"All the details will be probed but the movement of troops in vehicles should have been avoided, especially at a time when the Maoists go on the offensive and plan such attacks to obtain mass casualty."

RK Vij

Chhattisgarh police officials told PTI on Friday, 28 April that the IED was planted around 2 months ago by the Maoists and remained undetected despite a demining exercise that was conducted a day before the attack.

Vij further said, "The SOP during the movement of troops is to ensure that there are no suspicious elements on both the sides."

A 'road opening party' ensures this, as a 'bomb detection' team is also deployed to detect IEDs.

Police officials say that a combination of both these exercises help in either the detection of IEDs or the people planning to trigger it thus increasing chances of mitigating loss of life.

A senior officer who has served in Bastar, which has high Maoist presence, claimed that the relaxed state of approach by the security forces is resulting in sloppy decision-making, allowing the Maoists to exploit their vulnerabilities and target the forces. 

"If an anti-Maoist operation is carried out once every three months or six months, it won't work. It has to be done regularly. Exercises like area domination should be done almost every day, extensively. The soldiers going out should have enough practice, otherwise they will end up missing something or ignoring things that can turn fatal in a conflict zone."

The official

Data Shows Maoists Losing Ground, but...

A comparative data from the Chhattisgarh government between January 2019 and June 2022 shows a decline in the number of engagement of fire incidents (encounters) from 54 in 2019 and 57 in 2020 to 43 in 2022. 

Simultaneously, the number of Naxal incidents has also declined from 165 in 2019 and 159 in 2020 to 131 in 2022.

In his recent visit to Bastar, Union Home Minister Amit Shah also claimed that the fight with Maoists is "in its last leg and would end soon."

Shah had said:

"CRPF has played the most crucial role in bringing the fight against Left-wing extremism to the final stage by making great sacrifices. This tale of victory will be written in gold in remembrance of their martyrdom."

Former special DGP Vij, however, said that while Left-wing extremism has declined, it would be too early to say that the Maoists are nearing their end.

"While Left-wing extremism is declining, security forces must remain vigilant. Surrenders are common, but new recruitments during COVID and the ability to extort money from contractors are still concerns."

Police officials deployed in Bastar also expressed a similar stance. They told The Quint that the situation on the ground might not be as it seems.

"As per government records, the encounters have come down and the Maoists are losing ground. But what they are not saying is that the security forces are not being sent on operations. It's an evasive technique to keep ignoring Maoists' presence and avoid bloodshed, thus helping the politicians. This, on the other hand, is giving Maoists time to rebuild, strategise, and attack us in our backyards."

An official